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POLICY CHALLENGE
We propose limited fiscal union, including the creation of a euro-area
finance ministry, with a minister with veto rights over national budgets
that could threaten euro-area sustainability. The ministry would also
assess the liquidity and solvency of governments facing difficulties, and
provide support to illiquid but solvent governments. It would be able to rely
on federal tax resources, and would set up and back up a euro-area deposit
insurance corporation with banking supervision and resolution authority.
Our plan implies a significant
transfer of sovereignty, requiring
a new political contract between
the euro area’s nations and
people. The finance minister
would be held democratically
accountable. Setting a clear tran-
sition to limited fiscal union
should create space for the Euro-
pean Central Bank to act as
lender of last resort.
The role of the euro-area finance minister
THE ISSUE The euro area's shortcomings have become abundantly clear. It
was set up without powers of strict surveillance over macroeconomic
imbalances, crisis management and resolution instruments, or adequate
banking supervision and resolution tools. The core reason for these failures
is the absence of a fiscal union with corresponding authority over fiscal,
structural and banking policies. Attempts to right these wrongs have been
ad hoc and have so far fallen short and moral hazard is prevalent. Financial
markets are increasingly aware of these inadequacies, and have started to
price in the possibility of the break up of the euro area.
Source: Bruegel. * Euro-area deposit insurance corporation.
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1. See Trichet (2011).
2. In particular by De
Grauwe (2011).
3. See, for instance,
Gerlach, Schulz and
Wolff (2010) and Wolff
(2011).
THE EURO AREA faces severe
challenges, with a break-up of
the monetary union now being
openly discussed. The recent
crisis has clearly exposed the
failure of the Maastricht architec-
ture for Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). Central to this fail-
ure is the lack of any fiscal
capacity at the euro-area level.
This Policy Brief proposes that
the EMU architecture must be
strengthened by taking steps
towards a fiscal union that
involves both a political authority
(a euro-area ‘finance minister’1)
and fiscal resources to prevent,
manage and resolve crises.
This would necessitate a new
treaty. Since it would amount to a
new contract between the
member states and the citizens
of the euro area, we propose that
the new treaty be preceded by a
Convention that would prepare
the ground for an Intergovern-
mental Conference (IGC). The
Convention would involve gov-
ernments, national parliaments,
European institutions and civil
society, and would take perhaps
one or two years. Another two
years would probably be needed
for the IGC to produce a new
treaty and for its ratification. 
Three or four years would not be
excessive if the end result is an
EMU architecture that includes
sufficient fiscal-union elements
that solidly reinforce the cur-
rently orphan monetary union.
Nevertheless, this is much too
long to be of help in resolving the
current crisis. We propose there-
fore that euro area leaders adopt
before the end of 2011 a declara-
tion outlining the contours of
such a process. By committing
the heads of state and govern-
ment of the euro area to create a
fiscal union, this declaration
should create the space needed
for the European Central Bank
(ECB) to act more forcefully to
contain the crisis.
The starting point of the declara-
tion would be recognition of the
three omissions of Maastricht.
First, failures in national struc-
tural policymaking that severely
jeopardise EMU functioning were
insufficiently addressed. Signifi-
cant real economic divergences
require very different structural
institutions in a monetary union
from those typically needed in an
economy with independent mon-
etary and exchange rate policies.
While it is analytically challeng-
ing to precisely identify the most
relevant aspects, it is clear that
labour and product market insti-
tutions can have severe
implications for the proper func-
tioning of EMU.
Second, the euro area
was not equipped
with a crisis manage-
ment and resolution
framework. There was
no institution that
could deal with insolvent coun-
tries. No mechanism was
available to deal with speculative
attacks against solvent but illiq-
uid countries. As has been
pointed out2, countries in a mon-
etary union face the fundamental
problem that they issue debt in a
foreign currency. As a result,
markets have the power to force
default on an individual member
state. A liquidity crisis will then
turn into a solvency crisis.
The third omission concerns
banking supervision and resolu-
tion. The current system remains
centred on national supervision,
but national supervisors do not
fully take on board the impact of
the fragility of national banking
systems on other euro-area
countries. National supervisors
therefore have a tendency to
conceal the true extent of prob-
lems in their banking system.
The European Banking Authority
does not have the power and
capacity to conduct deep and far-
reaching bank stress tests. In
addition, doubt about the sol-
vency of the sovereign quickly
endangers the solvency of the
national banking system,
because national banking sys-
tems are heavily exposed to the
country's sovereign debt. Con-
versely, fragility of the national
banking system quickly raises
doubts about the solvency of the
sovereign. Banking systems in
Europe are typically large rela-
tive to GDP, and
thinly capitalised.
The sovereign thus
has only limited
resources for pro-
tecting its domestic
financial system3.
The feed-back loop
connecting the banking sector
with fiscal fragility is the main
reason why sovereign liquidity
crises turn very quickly into fun-
damental financial-stability and
solvency crises. Bold fiscal
action alone cannot stabilise
sovereign spreads because capi-
tal flight from the banking
system happens very quickly
and in turn aggravates the fiscal
situation.
‘EMU architecture
must be strength-
ened by taking
steps towards a
fiscal union.’
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4. See Hallerberg,
Marzinotto and Wolff
(2011).
5. Marzinotto, Pisani-
Ferry and Sapir (2010).
AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE
The reaction of euro-area policy-
makers to the crisis falls short on
a number of grounds.
Adjustment mechanisms
The introduction of the euro typi-
cally was not accompanied by
structural reform to provide
countries with instruments to
contain their internal and exter-
nal imbalances. To address this,
a new Euro Plus Pact commits
members to competitiveness-
enhancing structural reforms (eg
further product-market liberali-
sation). The Euro Plus Pact has
been complemented with the so-
called Excessive Imbalance
Procedure (EIP), a new surveil-
lance instrument for non-fiscal
imbalances. These two innova-
tions are anchored into the
European Semester, through
which member states receive
guidance on growth-enhancing
structural reform early on in the
process and before measures
are discussed by national parlia-
ments. These reforms move in
the right direction but are not a
true transfer of sovereignty to
the euro-area level and lack
appropriate legitimacy due to the
modest involvement of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of national
parliaments4.
Fiscal assistance
Euro-area policymakers have
attempted to devise rescue
instruments in the midst of the
crisis. The result is a complex
institutional set-up that is only
partly coherent, certainly incom-
plete and possibly ineffective.
Before the crisis, the EU only had
mechanisms to provide financial
assistance to EU countries out-
side the euro area and to non-EU
countries5. Since the start of the
crisis, new mechanisms have
been created to assist euro-area
countries in difficulty. In turn, all
the rescue instruments now
available differ in terms of size,
guarantee structure, target
group and governance (Box 1).
Some of the instruments build on
the so-called Community
method, in which the European
Commission plays a key role and
the Council of Ministers votes on
financial assistance and the con-
ditions attached to it by qualified
majority voting (QMV). The Euro-
pean Financial Stabilisation
Mechanism (EFSM), created in
May 2010, is based on the Com-
munity method, as was the
earlier balance-of-payments
(BoP) assistance, which was the
BOX 1: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE EU
Figure 1 shows the composition of financial packages for each currently
or formerly assisted country. We distinguish between support from i)
global institutions (IMF, EBRD, World Bank); ii) other member states
through bilateral loans; iii) intergovernmental programmes (Greek loan
facility, EFSF); and iv) Community tools (EFSM, BoP assistance). Most
funds are disbursed under an intergovernmental logic. The second most
important source of funding in Europe comes from the IMF, while mutual
assistance under the Community method comes only third.
Figure 1: Financially-assisted countries by creditor and type of pro-
gramme (2008-2014)
Source: Bruegel. * Figures for Greece include the €109 billion package agreed on 21 July
2011. The total sum is distributed across programmes on the assumption that €45 billion of
deficit reduction is split by two-thirds and one-third between the EU and the IMF, as it was for
previous programmes; €20 billion from the EFSF is used for debt buy-back programmes; and
an additional €20 billion from the EFSF goes towards the recapitalisation of the Greek bank-
ing system, as in the draft agreement.
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blueprint for the EFSM. By con-
trast, other crisis instruments,
from the Greek loan facility to the
European Financial Stabilisation
Fund (EFSF) and the future Euro-
pean Stabilisation Mechanism
(ESM), are based on intergovern-
mental arrangements or treaties
between euro-area member
states, where the European Com-
mission only provides technical
assistance and all important
decisions are taken by govern-
ments acting unanimously.
In a nutshell, the euro-area finan-
cial assistance mechanisms set
up since the start of the crisis
have three distinct features: 
• First, the traditional Commu-
nity method has been
sidelined. Most of the deci-
sions are taken on the basis of
intergovernmental deals
between member states, with
each exercising veto power. The
future European Stabilisation
Mechanism (ESM), due to start
operating in 2013, will also be
a stand-alone intergovernmen-
tal treaty, under which
decisions to grant financial
assistance will be taken by
unanimity6. Yet, the unanimity
principle reduces the efficacy
of instruments that need to be
promptly available on the
market, and might end up
defeating the purpose of finan-
cial assistance, as the recent
difficulties of the EFSF attest.
• Second, the emerging gover-
nance framework is complex.
The decision to grant financial
assistance is taken some-
times by the Eurogroup,
sometimes by the ECOFIN
Council and sometimes by the
European Council, with the
consequence that the same
country may be granted finan-
cial assistance through
different procedures and dis-
bursements made at different
speeds7. Conditionality is exer-
cised by different institutions
than those responsible for loan
disbursement, opening up an
undesirable void between
assistance and control.
• Third, the European and
national parliaments are too
little involved in the oversight
of the financial assistance
programmes (Goulard 2011).
Except for the Bundestag,
national parliaments have
only been modestly involved
ex ante in the discussion of
size, definition, conditionality
and disbursement of funds in
accordance with national pro-
cedures. The European
Parliament, in principle the
institution best placed to rep-
resent the interests of the
Union, has been sidelined. 
The euro area needs a permanent
and credible mechanism to coun-
teract liquidity crises, but which
is also able to cope with cases of
insolvency. The ESM, due to start
operating in June 2013, is a can-
didate for this. But it suffers from
three major shortcomings. First,
as major ESM decisions are
taken by unanimity, delays are
likely. Second, the ESM is not
large enough to avert the risk of
contagion to large countries.
Third, its structure does not allow
the identified weaknesses in
banking supervision and resolu-
tion to be addressed, a topic that
will be further discussed in the
next section.
Strengthening surveillance of
the financial system
The failures of financial sector
supervision exposed by the
2007 crisis were addressed at
EU level with the creation of new
institutions responsible for
macro- and micro-prudential
supervision. These institutions
are still in their infancy. One, the
European Banking Authority
(EBA), debuted with the round of
stress tests in the summer of
2011, covering 90 European
banks. Subsequent problems at
one of the tested banks, Dexia,
and the general decline in trust in
the euro-area banking system,
revealed, however, that the
stress tests were insufficiently
robust. The EBA still has to rely
on information provided by
national supervisors, who ulti-
mately have the authority to
intervene. The EBA is thus not yet
a true European supervisor.
The limited supervisory role of
the EBA is, of course, related to
the absence of financial means
at EU level to support banks in
difficulty. Taxpayers’ resources
remain firmly in the hands of
national governments and parlia-
ments, and logically therefore
member states have the sole
responsibility for banking super-
vision. The European Council of
21 July 2011 gave the power to
the enhanced EFSF to provide
loans for banking sector support,
even to countries not formally
under programme. While this
agreement is a step towards
some euro-area banking
arrangements, it creates a
number of problems. First, it
does not completely break the
6. Non euro-area
member states eligible
for BoP assistance will
paradoxically remain
the only ones that
receive financial assis-
tance under
Community rules.
7. By way of example,
Greece received fund-
ing through the Greek
loan facility decided at
the May 2010 Euro-
pean Council, but was
also promised assis-
tance through the EFSF,
disbursements from
which are decided by
the Eurogroup.
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8. Gianviti et al (2010)
have made proposals to
this effect. 
9. Italian financing
needs until the end of
2012 do not exceed
€500 billion. At a
current rate of seven
percent, a payment of
€15 billion (€500
billion x three percent)
would bring the actual
budget impact down to
a de-facto interest rate
of four percent.
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Conceptually it is clear, however,
that the euro area should have a
system that allows for orderly
sovereign default for insolvent
countries8. The euro-area finance
ministry could do the initial
insolvency assessment.
For clear cases of illiquidity, the
natural lender of last resort
should be the ECB since it is the
only institution that can provide
unlimited liquidity. With common
euro-area fiscal resources avail-
able, the ECB could fulfil the
lender-of-last-resort function
that its current mandate does
not permit. The euro-area finance
ministry would need to stand
behind any possible losses the
ECB may incur resulting from
exercice of this function.
Some may object, however, to the
ECB playing this role. The main
reason is that there could be
political pressure to monetise
the debt of what appear at first
sight to be illiquid countries, but
which turn out to be insolvent. In
fact, allowing the ECB to act as a
lender of last resort will change
the federal finance ministry’s
incentives in its assessment of
insolvency versus liquidity. In
case of realised losses, the euro-
area finance minister may exert
significant pressure on the cen-
tral bank to recover the losses by
monetising them. Giving the ECB
this role could thus ultimately be
inflationary. This is the central
reason why Germany currently
does not accept the ECB acting
as the lender of last resort.
The creation of a euro-area
finance ministry can, however,
easily mitigate this. In fact, as
currently foreseen with the ESM,
the euro-area finance ministry
could play the role of lender of
last resort. In case of illiquidity in
a euro-area country, the finance
ministry should have the ability
to credibly intervene in the bond
market. The euro-area finance
ministry needs, however, to have
sufficient firepower to ensure
that this can credibly be done.
The euro-area finance ministry
as we envisage it is certainly
credible, as it would have direct
recourse to euro-area taxpayers
and consequently could borrow
on the market at lower rates than
the country facing liquidity prob-
lems. Different forms of
intervention can be envisaged.
One could think of taking a coun-
try from the market as is
currently done in countries
receiving financial assistance.
After a period of adjustment, the
country would regain market
access as confidence is restored.
Alternatively, the euro-area
finance ministry could commit to
payments that would offset the
increased borrowing costs due to
rising rates. This would change
the debt solvency dynamics and
prevent self-fulfilling crises. It
would imply comparatively small
payments equivalent to the dif-
ference in the market interest
rate and the rate that is deemed
sustainable, multiplied by the
debt to be refinanced9. 
Related to this, we propose the
creation of euro-area institutions
to regulate and supervise the
euro-area financial system. Euro-
area banking systems are large
compared to their national sover-
eigns. No fiscal capacity is
currently available to deal with
link between banking and sover-
eign risk at national level
because support to banks would
be channelled via their sover-
eign. Second, the governance of
the new system does not provide
the right incentives. It reduces
the ex-ante incentive for govern-
ments to properly supervise
national banks. Third, loans pro-
vided to countries that do not fall
formally under conditionality
raise the issue of ex-post control. 
TOWARDS A FISCAL UNION
EMU set-up needs a significant
overhaul because current struc-
tures are clearly inadequate. We
propose the creation of a limited
euro-area fiscal union. The core
of any fiscal union is the avail-
ability of fiscal resources at the
federal level. A corresponding
structure is needed with a federal
finance ministry headed by a
minister with the power to raise
revenues and take decisions on
how to use them. We spell out the
functions that would be exer-
cised at euro-area level, how
they could be exercised, and how
they could be subject to demo-
cratic oversight.
Functions to be exercised at
euro-area level
The euro area needs a lender of
last resort that can help illiquid
but solvent countries. As a first
step, a decision needs to be
made on whether a country is
insolvent or illiquid. De facto, it is
very difficult to make such a
decision and in reality even in
cases of insolvency there may
be a desire to provide assistance
to preserve financial stability.
the insolvencies of banks that
are too large to be saved by
national taxpayers, even if this
capacity were in the interest of
the euro area as a whole. The
very high level of financial inte-
gration in the euro area should
be matched by an equally inte-
grated banking supervision and
resolution authority. The euro-
area finance ministry should
help establish such an authority.
It should have sole supervisory
authority over all systemic
banks, with complete and direct
access to all information for the
relevant institutions. In addition
all euro-area banks that accept
deposits should contribute an
insurance premium to this
authority which would therefore
act at a euro-area deposit insur-
ance corporation (EDIC) similar
to the US FDIC10. A euro-area
deposit insurance scheme would
go a long way to breaking the
existing link between banks and
their national sovereigns which
tends to become a vicious circle
in times of crisis. The EDIC would
ultimately have to be backed by
euro-area fiscal capacity.
The creation of euro-area institu-
tions to regulate and supervise
euro-area financial institutions
does not mean that EU-wide
institutions such as the Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) and the European Bank-
ing Authority (EBA) should be
discontinued. On the contrary,
since all EU countries belong to
the single financial market these
institutions should be reinforced.
However, there is a strong case
for also creating specific euro-
area institutions owing to the
fact that the ECB, the euro-area
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10. The IMF endorsed
early on the need for EU
banking federalism. For
an overview, also on
the FDIC, see Fonteyne
et al (2010).
11. Federal decision-
making can only
operate effectively if
national political and
administrative systems
follow orders and play
by the rules.
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central bank, plays a role of
lender of last resort vis-à-vis the
euro-area financial system.
Having euro-area institutions to
regulate and supervise euro-area
financial institutions should
therefore be viewed as the com-
plement to the ECB in its
lender-of-last-resort role.    
Increased fiscal integration
would have to be accompanied
by euro-area level competencies
and powers over the supervision
of national policymaking. In case
of national economic policy
decisions with potentially
significant negative impact on
the rest of the euro area, the
euro-area finance minister
should be given a veto right over
such decisions. This veto right
should be far reaching and
extend to budget decisions. Such
strong control is necessary in
order to avoid massive free-
riding by individual nation
states. In exceptional circum-
stances, when a country is
declared insolvent, the federal
level could even be given the
authority to approve the
appointment of a number of key
senior national policymakers11.
In addition, the euro-area finance
ministry could be given the right
to directly access certain
revenues should national
policymaking fail to stick to
commitments. In terms of struc-
tural policies, intervention
should take place if a strong
analytical basis exists demon-
strating severe implic-ations for
the functioning of EMU. For the
financial system, a common
fiscal back-stop will require a
common supervisory authority
to offset the moral hazard.
The effectiveness and impartial-
ity of the euro-area finance
minister would be increased by
the creation of an independent
fiscal council that issues opin-
ions on budgetary situations, the
need for assistance, solvency
assessments, the implementa-
tion of reforms and national-level
fiscal adjustments. Its manda-
tory opinions would be delivered
not only to the finance minister
but also to the European Parlia-
ment and national parliaments
so as to ensure wide publicity.
While its opinions could be over-
ruled by the euro-area finance
minister, the latter would have to
explain its reason for doing so in
front of the European Parliament. 
Our proposal addresses most of
the shortcomings we have identi-
fied in the responses to date to
the euro-area crisis. First, deci-
sions about financial assistance
should be taken at a suprana-
tional level by majority so that
they cannot be blocked by each
and every member state.
Second, the overall procedure for
crisis prevention, management
and resolution would ultimately
be simplified because all stages
are in the hands of the same
actor. Third, the interlinkages
between the fiscal situation and
financial supervision and regula-
tion could be addressed, not
least because the future Euro-
pean banking union would be
based on some concrete fiscal
capacity. Finally, the legitimacy
of the new euro-area set up
would be strengthened, as
pointed out below where we clar-
ify the details of the financing,
the legitimacy and the transition
to the fiscal union. 
Financing
We note that all successful cur-
rency areas have a sizeable
federal budget; our proposal
involves a smaller one. We argue
that the euro-area finance min-
istry would need a taxing
capacity of perhaps two percent
of euro-area GDP in case loans
provided to an illiquid country
were to turn bad or bank recapi-
talisation needs were to exceed
the funds available in the EDIC
insurance. Euro-area GDP is
around €9,000 billion. With a
permanent income stream of
€90 billion annually (ie one per-
cent), one could borrow up to
€2250 billion at a hypothetical
interest rate of four percent. This
borrowing capacity would be
large enough to take Italy and
Spain from the market for several
years. Alternatively, a payment
mechanism that would guaran-
tee that liquidity crises do not
become self-fulfilling by reduc-
ing the budgetary impact of
spreads could be established
with limited tax resources12. Until
a proper insurance fund for bank
deposits is built up, some further
tax capacity may be needed to
cover the most immediate recap-
italiation needs of banks.
The tax-raising power would not
necessarily be activated. In fact,
as in the current EFSF/ESM, the
euro-area finance ministry would
borrow on the market at a low
interest rate and lend to the
country concerned at a preferen-
tial interest rate. The euro-area
revenue would only have to be
activated if the country was to
default. The capital provided and
injected into the banking system
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12. In the worst case
scenario, under which
Italian sovereign rates
would stay at 10 percent
until all €1900 billion of
debt is rolled over,
around €110 billion in
annual payments would
be needed to offset the
budget impact of the
high rates.
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would have to be borrowed
directly against the revenue flow.
If one was to choose fiscal pay-
ments to countries under attack,
one would obviously have to
raise the revenue.
We leave open which tax instru-
ments the euro-area finance
ministry could use to raise fed-
eral revenue. To cover the cost of
the EDIC insurance, an insurance
fee would be raised from the
insured industry, even though
when it is introduced tax rev-
enues may be needed until the
insurance fund has built up capi-
tal. Tax-raising power would
always be needed to backstop
the insurance in case of a severe
shock. From an optimal taxation
point of view, it is important that
tax rates are relatively stable,
and that they are levied on rela-
tively inelastic revenue items.
Legitimacy
The euro-area finance minister
would head a powerful institu-
tion. It is thus of the utmost
importance that its establish-
ment and operations be
democratically legitimised. For
the establishment, the institu-
tions preparing the necessary
Treaty revisions, ie the IGC and
the European Convention prepar-
ing the IGC, will need to involve
governments, national parlia-
ments, European institutions
with more than just observer
status, and civil society repre-
sentatives. The President of the
European Convention and the IGC
should be democratically
accountable. The (indirect)
involvement of citizens will be
paramount.
It is beyond the scope of this
Policy Brief to elaborate the dem-
ocratic framework underlying the
euro-area finance ministry. Cer-
tainly, the euro-area finance
minister will need to be elected
by the European Parliament and
the Council in euro-area compo-
sition by the normal majority
rule. All major decisions would
have to be put to a vote in the two
chambers. This would concern in
particular decisions to raise
taxes and to veto national poli-
cies. The new federal structure
would thus have to acquire fed-
eral democratic legitimacy. It is
also crucial that decisions taken
by the euro-area finance minis-
ter that would alter national
government and parliament
decisions, be explained and
debated in front of national par-
liaments by the euro-area
finance minister. 
Transition
Euro-area leaders have asked the
Euro-Summit President to make
proposals for limited treaty
changes. We have sketched out
proposals for major treaty
changes that we think will ulti-
mately have to be put in place in
order to put the euro on a sound
footing. We are aware that this
will not happen overnight. It is
important, however, to reach a
swift political agreement to move
forward in such a direction in
order to allow current institu-
tions to prevent the worst from
happening.
In the short term, the most
urgent task is to end the fragility
of the banking sector and the
increasing sovereign market
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pressures. Only part of the bank-
ing fragility is related to the
feedback loop connecting sover-
eign and banking risk. Bank
recapitalisation is therefore
needed as such, even if the sov-
ereign bond market could be
completely stabilised. Bank
recapitalisation could be
achieved as follows. First, the
EFSF/ESM should have the
capacity to directly recapitalise
the banks and to guarantee
deposits. Second, if needed, the
resources of the EFSF/ESM
should be increased. Third,
access to the appropriate per-
sonnel to restructure and control
banks is necessary. For this, a
the Council and European Parlia-
ment in euro-area composition.
In the transition phase, the ECB
will have to play a significant role
to back-stop the financial system
and the sovereign bond market.
The latter can be done once there
is a commitment to move
towards more fiscal federalism
and as long as reforms are con-
tinuously enacted.
The authors are grateful to col-
leagues for comments on earlier
versions of this paper, and to
Chiara Angeloni for excellent
research assistance.
13. Posen and Véron
(2009).
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Resolution Trust Cooperation
under the control of a euro-area
political representative could be
formed. The EBA and ESRB would
need to step up banking sector
supervision and should be
placed under the control of the
same political representative.
The same political representative
would also head the EFSF and the
emerging ESM. Existing func-
tions of the Commission should
be merged with the nucleus of
the finance ministry, and the
resulting structure should be
outside the Commission princi-
ple of collegiality. The emerging
euro-area finance minister would
from the outset be appointed by
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